UNMIK/PR/1280
SRSG Søren Jessen-Petersen delivered the following speech today in London to the Royal Institute of International Affairs:
Ladies and gentlemen, I am very pleased to be here this afternoon. I welcome this opportunity to speak with you as candidly as I can about Kosovo, where we are, the road ahead, and how Kosovo fits in to the Balkan region as a whole.
I had been to Kosovo many times before I arrived in August as Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General. I accepted this job – described by many as impossible – because I strongly believe that Kosovo is the last piece in the puzzle taking the western Balkans from the conflicts of the ‘90s towards normalisation, stabilisation and European integration.
Moreover, I consider myself quite fortunate to have arrived at the moment when everybody, both in Kosovo, in the region, in Europe and beyond, understood that we could not maintain for much longer what has been since 1999 a holding operation.
When the violence exploded in March, we all saw the terrible consequences of trying to manage security in a climate of a lack of economic prospects, dramatic rates of unemployment, uncertainty over status, ethnic differences that had widened rather than narrowed. 21 people were killed, 4,000 driven from their homes and more than 30 churches and religious monuments were destroyed. It was a clear wake-up call that deeper problems had to be addressed.
The crisis provided not only an opportunity but underlined the necessity to address all the things that went wrong in March without awarding violence, and to break the taboo and put status talks on the agenda. On this basis, I outlined five priorities:
- security – as the basis of everything we do;
- prioritising and accelerating the Standards, both in order to take the steps needed to build a multi-ethnic society and with a view to fulfilling the main preconditions for opening status talks;
- giving more authority to the local elected leaders, but also demanding greater accountability from them;
- protection of minorities, including freedom of movement and returns of displaced persons, as key components of the Standards; and
- moving aggressively on the economy, an overarching priority that underpins all the other progress we hope to make.
Since March the progress achieved in repairing the physical damage has been tangible and encouraging. The schools and most of the houses have been rebuilt and the Kosovo Government agreed to provide cash grants to returning families to replace their possessions and make sure people who work in the fields have their tools and equipment back. To repair the religious sites and monuments, we established an independent implementation committee with UNMIK, representatives of the Kosovo Government, the Council of Europe, a representative of the Kosovo Serbs, a representative of Belgrade, and the Orthodox Church. A little over €5 million was made available from the Kosovo budget and UNMIK’s resources to repair the religious sites. Unfortunately, just when we were ready to move, the Orthodox Church suspended its participation and there has been no progress since then. On the other hand, there has been continuing progress in investigating, arresting and prosecuting those responsible for the violence. And the declining trend in crimes against members of minority communities resumed after the events in March.
We have now turned the crisis of March into an opportunity to move towards the resolution of the Kosovo issue. And we have done it without rewarding violence. We now have a clear agreement with the Contact Group on a way ahead that will take us into a process leading to talks on the status. Progress will depend on implementation of those priorities among the Standards that are linked to a multi-ethnic Kosovo. In other words, only by showing progress in the areas where Kosovo failed last March, positive review of Standard implementation can be made, possibly next summer. And only in case of a positive assessment will there be a chance of moving forward in the process leading to status discussions.
As I said, those priorities that we have defined are exactly all those areas that led to break down in March, that is the area of security, rule of law, protection of minorities including freedom of movement, return of displaced persons, and decentralisation. They are defined in such a way that they are realistic, achievable goals.
We have also embarked on quarterly reviews to monitor progress. We have set up a system whereby progress can be measured by the Contact Group and the Security Council. By mid-2005 the Contact Group will make an evaluation on the progress made on Standards implementation and, following that, the UN Security Council will make its judgment on whether progress has been sufficient.
The first quarterly review of Standards has just taken place and the results were mixed. There is clearly a great deal more to do, and no time to lose. But I believe that a determined new government can achieve progress in the time available.
The Kosovo elections at the end of October were an important step forward in the consolidation of democracy and the process of stabilisation and normalisation. The elections were held in a peaceful manner, and they were judged to be free and fair by the Council of Europe and the OSCE, and to be procedurally sound. No significant political or security incidents interrupted polling, which overall took place in a fully safe and secure environment that allowed people to vote freely.
While the overall turnout was good, I regret very much the disappointingly low turnout of the Kosovo Serbs. Understandably, many of them are traumatised by the March events and dissatisfied with their living conditions, including inadequate freedom of movement and concerns about security and the economic situation. Another reason was anti-democratic pressure and intimidation not to vote and, consequently, fear of retribution. It is also true that Kosovo Serb politicians registered late, following the much appreciated and forward-looking call to participate by President Tadic, and therefore had very little time to mobilise voters. Belgrade was divided, and regrettably there were calls by leading government authorities in Serbia for a boycott. However, the boycott did not seem to be part of a well thought out strategy, and Belgrade still seems to be struggling to formulate a policy on Kosovo that it in the larger interest of normalisation and stabilisation in the region and European integration.
I have made it very clear that we want the Kosovo Serbs to be part of democratic institutions, in the Assembly and in all the municipalities. I have urged the elected Kosovo Albanian representatives to reach out to the Kosovo Serbs and work with them to improve their living conditions. We want everyone to be part of the process moving Kosovo forward. We cannot change the past, but we must make Kosovo a place where everyone can live safely with a feeling of a better future for themselves and for their children. Hence our focus on the implementation of priorities among the Standards that are directly in the interests of the Kosovo Serbs. That requires an active participation in dialogue and it will not be helped by boycotts. We have a clear plan, we know how to move forward, we have a clear timetable and we want to draw the minorities in.
Following the successful election, a new government consisting of two parties, LDK and AAK, and led by Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj was elected last Friday. Although it might well have been preferable at this stage to have a broad coalition in place, for the first time in Kosovo’s short recent history we will now have a parliament with a strong opposition. I trust that this opposition, when playing its legitimate and democratic role, will show mature political judgement in the interest of Kosovo’s move towards a positive review of Standards and status talks.
I cannot hide that many concerns were expressed at the time the parties first put forward Mr Haradinaj’s name as a potential Prime Minister, in view of reports that ICTY is pursuing a case related to him. However, I could not and would not intervene to block a fully transparent, democratic process. And – although uneasy – the International Community has supported me on this.
Let me be clear: Mr Haradinaj has been duly elected as the Prime Minister of Kosovo – in accordance with democratic and constitutional principles and rules. If ICTY proceeds with its case against him, I trust it will be based, in accordance with its mandate and responsibility, on justice at work. And, should this occur, I am confident that Mr. Haradinaj and Kosovo will act in the larger interest of stability and progress in Kosovo and show the world and the region an example of compliance with the judicial process, just as they have shown respect for democracy.
Questions have also been raised about the political profile and skills of some of the ministers selected for the cabinet. We have held good consultations with the parties and expressed our view that Kosovo must have able, competent officials, particularly at the highest level, who are able to work quickly and make the progress necessary on the Standards and the other priority areas. I have also told the President and Prime Minister that we will look closely at the work of the Provisional Institutions, including the Government, and shortly we will be able to see who is capable and who is not.
And we will be able to act. In case of unsatisfactory performance, I have the authority to take remedial action – and I intend to use that authority now to show how serious we are about the need to move forward urgently. I am prepared to deal with officials – both at central and municipal level – who fail to carry out their duties responsibly, or who block attempts to make improvements in key areas. These areas include – but are not limited to – minority rights, freedom of movement, returns of displaced persons, equal provision of services, responsible media, and security.
There are a number of tools and measures at my disposal, based on Security Council Resolution 1244, to help ensure compliance. The use of disciplinary measures must of course be commensurate with the offence. Their use must be a solution of last resort. The Government has a primary responsibility here in taking all measures to ensure progress. I should hope therefore that I will not need to use sanctions, but I am fully prepared to do so in the interests of progress towards Standards and status in Kosovo. Such sanctions would be applied regardless of party affiliation, and regardless of ethnicity.
As I mentioned earlier, security is the basis of everything we do, and we are working closely together with the NATO-led KFOR military force to prepare for any security shocks that we may encounter as we move into sensitive moments linked to standards review and status talks.
KFOR and UNMIK have learned the lessons of March and have improved our performance and preparedness to make sure that this never happens again. These efforts are confirmed by the fact that there has been, since March, only one single serious ethnic related incident. Throughout the four-week election campaign and on Election Day itself there was not one ethnically related incident.
Closer coordination and cooperation have been established between the UNMIK Police, the local Kosovo Police Service and KFOR at all levels, clarifying the respective responsibilities of our institutions for security and the maintenance of public order. Command, control, communications, liaison, and planning arrangements and mechanisms have been strengthened including establishment of joint operations centres.
But while all these measures address the potential physical threat to minority communities, we have also to address the perceptions of members of those communities about their own safety and that of their families. I have acknowledged publicly that the concerns of both the Kosovo Serbs and of Belgrade over security are legitimate. We have established local Crime Prevention Councils across Kosovo at municipal level to bring together representatives of the municipal authorities and representatives of civil society, including all communities, with UNMIK (Police and Civil Administration) and KFOR, in order to discuss and explain security measures and matters concerning public safety. And last July, we established the Kosovo Security Advisory Group to address security concerns at the central level.
It is also my intention in the near future to have a team of external specialists conduct an Internal Security Sector Review to consider holistically the challenges to peace and stability within the boundaries of Kosovo. Its aim will be to identify Kosovo’s internal security needs, before addressing the gaps in current security and emergency arrangements and developing options to close those gaps. Only once these initial stages are complete would it be time to address the future development of existing organisations, be they the Kosovo Police Service, border control assets, or the Kosovo Protection Corps and other civil emergency agencies.
More immediately we must establish the conditions in which displaced persons from Kosovo can make a free decision whether to return to their homes – and others can decide that their future remains in Kosovo. Returns have been a disappointing few in Kosovo so far, but they are happening. We have just established a Kosovo ministry for minorities and returns, which will put more authority, and also more responsibility, into the hands of the Kosovars themselves to lead this process. Refugees and migration is something I have worked on for many years, and it is an area that I am convinced can be dealt with better by UNMIK now in partnership with the elected institutions, centrally and locally.
We must also address freedom of movement because we cannot expect the world to agree to move forward on final status talks if we have not addressed a situation where people feel they have to be protected by barbed wire barricades and a 24-hour presence of peacekeeping troops.
Improved security and freedom of movement are the pivotal factors to accelerate the return of displaced persons to Kosovo. UNMIK and KFOR are now better positioned to provide protection, but only Kosovo Albanian leaders and society can and must effectively dispel the need for such protection and create true security.
We have revisited our strategy for returns and are looking at a combination of:
- more specific security and freedom of movement initiatives;
- incentives or disincentives for co-operative or obstructive officials respectively; and
- more targeted use of sanctions.
With action taken in these areas I am confident that next spring could see a significant increase in returns. The local leaders are aware that without such progress, one of the key priority Standards will remain unmet.
We must also make progress to improve the very bad economic situation in Kosovo. Economic growth is slowing, international aid is decreasing, remittances from the diaspora have declined, and access to credit from international financial institutions remains blocked, although we have lately seen some breakthroughs in this area. The balance of trade is overwhelmingly negative, with Kosovo reliant on imports for even basic necessities like foodstuffs.
The economy is possibly the biggest threat to stability and reconciliation, while at the same time the most obvious victim of the lack of certainty on status. Work has been underway for some time to develop a National Economic Development Plan. This work must be accelerated. I expect the EU to play an increasingly active role in this effort.
While we work on longer-term measures to improve the economy, we have undertaken short-term efforts to address joblessness in co-operation with UNDP and the local authorities. And we must at the same time move on privatisation in order to stimulate the economy. While the privatisation process is moving forward, outstanding legal issues remain and we still have blockages due to unclear ownership issues. We are finally close to having a possible solution to make sure that privatisation goes ahead without delay.
We also must give local communities more say over their own lives and bring their government closer to them. One key way of reaching out to the communities is through decentralisation, or reform of local government to form the basis for the successful integration of Kosovo’s minority communities into the fabric of society. Together with the Kosovo Government, we have formed a working group, with the participation of Kosovo Serb observers and with the support of the Council of Europe, and formulated a plan for decentralisation completed in July. It is a practical programme to build links between local authorities and citizens, giving all citizens equal access to all rights. Kosovo Serbs have at times participated, at times not. I hope they will join in to help bring this process to fruition. It is in their direct interest to participate, and in our interest that they do so.
Let me make one important point as we move forward on decentralisation: Territorial division is not an option. It is not desirable in principle, nor possible in practice, to divide such a small place where only one third of the Kosovo Serbs live in Mitrovica and the north, and the remaining two thirds are scattered across the rest of Kosovo, mostly in small rural areas. However, it is exactly because of the Serbs isolated and exposed locations that their security as well as economic and social rights must be ensured through the meaningful plan on decentralisation developed by the Pristina Working Group. But this plan can and will be enriched by elements from a plan developed by Belgrade earlier in the year, particularly in the area of security.
Dialogue at various levels is key. In addition to the principal Pristina-based dialogue between Kosovo’s majority and minority communities, I hope that we can resume and reinforce the Direct Dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade. I have visited Belgrade twice since assuming office and had good, constructive talks. We now need to move on Direct Dialogue. The four Working Groups established by my predecessor one year ago are dormant and we are looking into ways of resuscitating them. Most importantly, we must make progress on the issue of missing persons: I recently suggested to the Serbian Prime Minister that we re-start the dialogue on missing persons under the auspices of the International Red Cross, and I very much hope he will accept. Not moving on this issue, or linking it to other issues, would mean adding further pain to the agonies of the families of missing persons who have a right to know as soon as possible what happened to their loved ones. Too much time has already passed on this unbearable uncertainty.
I am concerned that there seem to be those who want and who are determined to block any efforts on our part and on the part of Kosovo Albanians to create a multi-ethnic society which is safe and secure for everybody and where there is a future for everybody. My concern is that the victims of this policy are the very persons whom they pretend to represent. These are Kosovo Serbs who live scattered throughout Kosovo, often very isolated. They are now the victims of attempts to show that it is not possible to for them to live here. We have to find a way of reaching out to them and show them that indeed they are safe and they have a future.
On the other hand, if progress on standards implementation is blocked because of non-participation in the Assembly, Working Groups, and relevant dialogue by Belgrade or the Kosovo Serbs, it should not be held against those who are determined to move forward to establish a multi-ethnic Kosovo.
In case of a positive review of Standards by mid-2005, we have to move into totally uncharted territory: How do we open the status talks? Who will conduct the talks? Who will be there apart from Belgrade and Pristina, based on their legitimate interests according to Security Council Resolution 1244? Where will they be held? And most importantly what will be the principles and modalities that will determine what is on the agenda – and what is not?
I do not have the answers to these questions, but I expect that they will begin to be addressed soon. Certainly we cannot simply sit back and wait until next summer. Early next year we should start to reflect informally on the principles and modalities for status talks.
As we move closer to status talks, it is important that we improve the process of dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina on substantive issues and to build confidence. Also important is dialogue within the region, where all of Kosovo’s neighbours have an important stake in the outcome and an opportunity to play a constructive role.
I am absolutely convinced that it is not only in the interests of Kosovo, but of Serbia & Montenegro, FYROM, Albania and the wider region, to move towards certainty on status. I believe that certainty on status will allow Kosovo to move out of the current very difficult economic and social situation. But I believe it would also allow Belgrade to focus on its own economic and social priorities. Of course, there are other issues that have to be resolved before Belgrade can move forward, but I believe that removing the uncertainty over Kosovo is in the interests of normalisation and stabilisation in Kosovo, in Serbia and throughout the region.
I have told you that I believe Kosovo is the last piece in the puzzle to bringing stability and normality to the Western Balkans. Putting that piece in place will not be an easy job. My task, and that of all of us in the international community, is to take up this challenge and prepare the way forward. Ultimately we must enable and empower people of goodwill on all sides – Kosovo Albanians, Kosovo Serbs and other minorities – to create a more peaceful and prosperous future.
Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much.