UNMIK/PR/1308
First of all, sincere apologies from the SRSG that he was not able to attend this dialogue – he has regrettably had to change his plans at the last minute due to unforeseen surgery on a close family member.
On his behalf, I would like to give you a brief idea not only of where we are at present in Kosovo, but also the way we see the road ahead. The SRSG has often referred to Kosovo is the ‘last piece in the puzzle’ of the western Balkans as they move from the conflicts of the ‘90s towards normalization, stabilization and European integration. With progress being evident in parts of the region such as Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia, the need to resolve the Kosovo issue becomes more pressing. If I refer to ICG’s report several times during this presentation, it is because ICG, together with the European Policy Centre and the King Baudoin Foundation, organised an extremely useful discussion this morning on Kosovo.
For many years, the international community was in fact managing a so-called ‘holding operation’ in Kosovo. When the violence exploded in March, it was a clear wake-up call that something had to be done on the deeper problems – economic stagnation, uncertainty over status, and widening ethnic differences -; as mentioned in the ICG report released yesterday, the ‘status quo will not hold’.
Where we are
We are now addressing all the things that went wrong in March – without rewarding violence – and status talks are firmly – and fortunately – on the agenda of the international community, as we see also from this dialogue.
To make our view of the way ahead more clear, perhaps I can just say rapidly a few words on what has happened over the past months:
- Security has in fact been improving, with a declining trend in crimes against minorities. The co-operation between KFOR and UNMIK Police has been strengthened and many lessons have been learned – and integrated – following the March events. The recent visit of Serbian Prime Minister Kostunica was without incident. The perception of security by minorities is however still negative; there is an important role for Kosovo Albanian leaders and society to make them feel more safe;
- Reconstruction has progressed; many schools and houses have been rebuilt and the Kosovo Government is providing cash grants to returning families. Substantial funds are available to repair damaged religious sites and monuments; we have Council of Europe and UNESCO support, but the Orthodox Church has regrettably suspended its participation and thereby stopped progress;
- Priorities among the standards have been defined and are directly linked to what went wrong in March. These priorities are all focussed on the minorities; security, rule of law, protection of minorities including freedom of movement, return of displaced persons, and decentralization. They are defined in such a way that they are realistic, achievable goals. Progress by the PISG on these priority standards is a pre-condition for opening status talks, but of course the standards are intrinsically valuable in themselves as a way to move towards a multi-ethnic society;
- More authority has been, and is being transferred to the local elected leaders in areas not related to sovereignty. At the same time, the SRSG is demanding more accountability from leaders at central and municipal level for their actions, or, indeed, failure to act. An accountability policy is now in place and foresees sanctions that could be used by the SRSG against officials who do not perform or who block attempts to make improvements in key areas (such as minority rights, freedom of movement, returns of displaced persons, equal provision of services, responsible media, and security);
- Transfers of competence have also been made in the economy, an overarching priority which, if it does not improve, will be a threat to stability. We are very close to a solution on the difficult privatisation issue, which should help us in efforts to revitalise the economy;
- Democratic institutions are functioning, with free and fair elections last October and a rapid formation of the government. The President, Ibrahim Rugova, has agreed to relinquish his post as party leader in line with the Constitutional Framework. The Prime Minister, Ramush Haradinaj, has rapidly shown himself to be at the head of an energetic, decisive government with the drive to make real progress and to reach out to the minorities. As an example, the government is moving quickly on the implementation of pilot projects for decentralisation, a crucial field for the Kosovo Serbs in particular. A brief side remark as regards the Prime Minister; it will not be news to you that there has been much speculation on the possibility of an indictment by ICTY. Let me just say that we have seen democracy at work in Kosovo; the Prime Minister was elected in full accordance with the Constitutional Framework and legal principles. If necessary, we are confident that we will see justice at work in Kosovo, and that Kosovo will show the world and the region an example of compliance with the judicial process;
- The participation of the Kosovo Serbs in these processes is still very disappointing. They largely stayed away from the polls in October, for a variety of reasons. They have so far refused to enter the government and be active in the Assembly. They do not take part in the Kosovo Security Advisory Group that was designed to address their concerns. They have, until very recently, not participated at all in the Pristina-based working group on decentralisation, which are also open to advisors from Belgrade.
The way ahead
All of the above factors set the framework for the clear agreement on an approach and timetable that we have with the Contact Group on a way ahead that will take us into a process leading to talks on the status. To reach that process, progress must be made on the priority Standards linked to a multi-ethnic Kosovo. Only by showing progress in the areas where Kosovo failed last March, can a positive assessment of Standard implementation be made, foreseen for mid-2005. And only in case of a positive assessment will there be a chance of moving forward in the process leading to status discussions.
We are now conducting quarterly reviews to monitor progress, so that it can be measured by the Contact Group and the Security Council. The first quarterly review of Standards in November was mixed, showing that there was clearly a great deal more to do, and no time to lose. The new government has however shown its determination and in the six weeks since being formed, has demonstrated a dynamic and positive trend. We have just now completed our assessment for the three-month period as of November, to be presented to the Security Council in February. Again, some progress has been made, the trend is positive, but there is still much to be done, in particular in areas such as returns – where we hope this spring will see significant progress – or freedom of movement. In this context I will make an important point: lack of progress due to the non-participation of Kosovo Serbs, or due to active blockage, will not be held against those who genuinely make a best effort to achieve progress.
Move towards status resolution
I think it is clear that we are now moving closer to the resolution of the status issue, which is important not only for Kosovo, but of Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania and the wider region. Status resolution will help Kosovo with its difficult economic and social situation, and, frankly, would also allow Belgrade to focus on its own economic and social priorities.
Within UNMIK, we have the distinct advantage of ‘only’ being responsible for the facilitation of the political process leading up to the status talks; this means that we cannot speculate on the possible outcomes of such talks, but can comment on the way we get there.
First of all, with the clear approach and the clear timetable, it is obvious that the stakes are rising. This means that we have both an opportunity, and a risk. The opportunity is that we finally see Kosovo move towards a real multi-ethnic society, as the majority community has realised that the road to status resolution leads through consolidation of minority rights. We believe that the need to reach out to the minorities and bring them into society has been recognised. We are now, for example, seeing rapid movement on decentralisation that has taken some by surprise, including those in Kosovo and Belgrade who have been calling for it for some time.
As regards the risks: there is the risk of attempts to derail the process by various means. We cannot exclude provocations or violence by those who do not wish to see movement towards status resolution. Together with KFOR, we are better prepared for security shocks that we may encounter during this sensitive time. But the risk remains.
There is also the risk of blockage of efforts carried out by UNMIK and the Kosovo Albanians to create a multi-ethnic society. The victims of such blockage clearly would be the members of the minority communities, i.e. Kosovo Serbs living scattered throughout Kosovo. Again, we must be clear: if progress on standards implementation is blocked because of non-participation in the Assembly, Working Groups, and relevant dialogue by Belgrade or the Kosovo Serbs, it should not be held against those who are determined to move forward to establish a multi-ethnic Kosovo.
I would also add the risk of seeking solutions that in fact are not real solutions. I can be very specific, as the SRSG has mentioned this on many occasions: territorial division, or partition, is not an option. It is not desirable in principle, nor possible in practice, to divide such a small place where only one third of the Kosovo Serbs live in Mitrovica and the north, and the remaining two thirds are scattered across the rest of Kosovo, mostly in small rural areas. It would be very helpful if this option were to be ruled out as we move towards status resolution; it would facilitate the integration of minorities and would focus minds. We welcome ICG’s clear recommendation on this subject of partition.
Dialogue with Belgrade
In this crucial phase, the SRSG has made many efforts to improve dialogue with Belgrade at various levels. There is a clear need to improve dialogue on substantive issues and to build confidence, but, frankly, it is not always easy. In Belgrade last week, the SRSG hoped to discuss decentralisation and the re-activation of the Pristina-Belgrade dialogue on missing persons, to be chaired by the International Red Cross. Regrettably, the discussions were completely dominated by the issue of electricity – power cuts currently affect 3.500 households in Kosovo who are not paying their bills, of which 500 are Kosovo Serb households – and there was no substantial discussion of other issues. Admittedly, the energy supply is a problem, but one that we are working on; UNMIK unfortunately inherited a broken-down infrastructure. But the nature of the talks in Belgrade did raise the question of Belgrade’s preparedness (or willingness) to focus on the crucial issues at hand. I do understand that political divisions in Belgrade complicate this situation.
In case of a positive review of Standards by mid-2005, we have to move into totally uncharted territory: How do we open the status talks? Who will conduct the talks? Who will be there apart from Belgrade and Pristina, based on their legitimate interests according to Security Council Resolution 1244? Where will they be held? And most importantly what will be the principles and modalities that will determine what is on the agenda– and what is not?
Perhaps to your disappointment, I do not have the answers to these questions, but we expect and hope that they will begin to be addressed soon; the ICG report is a welcome impetus to focus everyone’s minds on the matter at hand. Certainly we cannot simply sit back and wait until next summer. Early this year, we should start to reflect informally on the principles and modalities for status talks. I would also echo ICG’s call for a clear timetable for the way forward – without wanting to comment on their specific recommendations – including for the time beyond the foreseen mid-2005 comprehensive assessment. Here we must however keep the balance between prudent preparation for status talks, and a focus on the issues, e.g. minority issues, on which the PISG still needs to make progress before status talks can begin.
I would say however that the international community will almost certainly be engaged in Kosovo for some time. That is not just in the interest of the international community; it is more than likely that any ‘post-status’ authority in Kosovo would request an international civilian and security presence to ensure stability and continued movement towards European integration. Soon, and simultaneously with the move towards status talks, UNMIK will be embarking on a review of requirements for a ‘post-status’ international presence. Here I am certain that the EU will be playing a key role, and therefore early thinking within the EU on that role would be very welcome.
Thank you for your attention. I would like to transmit the SRSG’s thanks to the European Parliament for the invitation to attend this hearing, and for its focus on this subject at a critical period for Kosovo.