UNMIK/PR/1387
PRISTINA – SRSG Søren Jessen-Petersen today addressed a conference on peace-building at the Centre for Security Policy in Geneva. The following is the text of his speech:
“Honoured Guests, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, thank you.
It is a great pleasure to be here and address such a clearly distinguished audience. I want to thank, particularly, my good friend, Dr Gérard Stoudmann, and the Director of the New Issues in Security Course, Dr Rama Mani, for inviting me here today.
I believe that you all came here not to hear about peace-building in general – many of you would be much better placed than I am to speak about that – but rather, I hope, to hear about peace-building in the Western Balkans, and specifically in Kosovo.
Current situation
Making a speech about peace-building is a lot like peace-building itself – it can be difficult to know where to begin. This is, I believe, particularly true in Kosovo where the formal end of the conflict in 1999 was not accompanied by an agreement “anchoring” that peace in fundamental terms. I will come back to this in more detail later. Suffice it to say at this stage that the lack of clarity on status is itself a peace-building problem in Kosovo – indeed in many ways it is the peace-building problem in Kosovo.
Kosovo has come a long way since 1999, with the Provisional Institutions of Self Government increasingly in the driving seat, albeit under the guidance and support of UNMIK and working closely with KFOR.
Since this speech is about the challenges of peace-building, I will of course discuss some of the many remaining problems we face in Kosovo. But these difficulties should properly be seen against a background of general improvement, and real progress, in Kosovo.
Security
Starting with the most fundamental aspect of peace-building anywhere in the world, and notwithstanding the contemptible attacks on UN, OSCE, and Government buildings in Pristina only last Saturday, the security situation is, I believe, as good now as it has ever been since 1999. Clearly tensions lie only beneath the surface, and that surface could easily be scratched given the sensitivities of the recently launched comprehensive review of progress on standards and, in case of a positive outcome of this review, the opening of status talks later this year. Threats to security could come from several different quarters, depending on the course of events. So complacency in this field is something that nobody can afford, and we are certainly not complacent. But with the now exceptional co-operation that UNMIK has with KFOR – and here I must pay special tribute to my friend and colleague, the French General and Commander of KFOR Yves de Kermabon – I believe we have reason to be satisfied with progress in the security area, and we have reason to be confident that we are well-equipped to address and respond to any threat.
Returns
At the same time, the challenges are many, and problems that we still have to tackle are also many. The number of returning displaced persons remains disappointingly low, and we would like to see the process accelerated significantly. However, the returns process should not be judged primarily on the number of people who choose to return, but they should be judged primarily on creating the conditions that will allow a displaced person to exercise a free choice as to whether to return or not.
First and foremost, like anywhere else in the world, returnees must have a sense of security, which must include the ability to move around freely. Second they must have clear property rights and ready access to that property. Finally, they must have economic opportunities to make their return sustainable in the mid- and long term.
These conditions are clearly inter-related and on all fronts I do see some improvement, despite occasional lack of momentum on the PISG side and also, at times, an ambiguous commitment to the returns process from certain quarters in Belgrade.
On property rights and access to property, we have seen good progress on this issue recently. But this has followed a long period of inaction and the work is nascent. Thankfully, the institutions are now working much better to deal with property disputes. Belgrade has a useful role to play in this respect by handing back to Kosovo the relevant cadastral records so that ownership and occupation of property can be ascertained more quickly.
In the economic sphere there is slow improvement, but improvement from a very low base. In the end we should not be naïve in our expectations of the economic prospects for returnees unless there is a significant improvement in the overall economic conditions of Kosovo. And I am afraid that we cannot expect to see any economic take off in Kosovo until the status question has been settled. At a macroeconomic level, Kosovo cannot borrow from the international financial institutions or resolve its debts in the absence of a status resolution. Meanwhile the legal ambiguities inherent in the current situation are too great for any large investor to tolerate. And without large investments any economic improvement in Kosovo, no matter how desperately needed – and it is desperately needed –, is likely to be incremental.
Freedom of movement
On freedom of movement, KFOR and UNMIK are committed right now to a process of carefully and gradually unfixing static roadblocks and positions near religious sites, and of reducing the provision of escorts. This is balanced with increased mobile patrolling and a greater role for the Kosovo Police Service in order to ensure that there is no lowering of overall security provisions for minorities. The increased role of the KPS is particularly important in that it hands the responsibility for protecting minorities to the local authorities, the PISG, where obviously it ultimately belongs. It is therefore a test of their capability in dealing with the task, and of their credibility as a multi-ethnic force. So far it is a test that they seem to be passing. Crime rates have not risen, and the number of individuals from minority groups moving freely has recently increased.
I believe the policy of unfixing static security positions has been the right one – perhaps most importantly inasmuch as it creates a greater sense of normality in the lives of both the minority and majority community. The best measure of this is recent polling evidence indicating that minorities now feel themselves to be safer than in the past – with 70% of those asked saying that they feel that today they can travel safely in Kosovo. In the same survey, of 451 people providing an answer, 75% indicated that they were moving around in their own vehicles, walked or took public transport when travelling, 9.6% used UN bus services, 1.3% travelled by unspecified “other means”. This leaves 13.7% travelling with escorts.
By any measure 13.7% is too high a figure. I do not think anyone in Kosovo – be they in UNMIK, KFOR or the PISG – should be satisfied until minority communities and their religious buildings no longer require protection as a matter of routine. But it is important that the figures be remembered. The image of minorities in Kosovo is all too often one of beleaguered groups beset by implacable enemies. The figures I have cited do not bear this out.
Freedom of movement and Belgrade
I mentioned earlier some ambiguity about commitment by some quarters in Belgrade to the returns process as a whole. Nobody questions that return is difficult – and here I am talking of the individuals concerned. The process involves overcoming numerous psychological barriers – fear being not the least of them. This fear is understandable – many returnees left their properties under duress and do not know what awaits them on return. All the more reason, therefore, for the Belgrade government to play its part in helping to overcome these barriers – by encouraging “go and see” visits, by co-operating with UNMIK and the PISG on issues such as the return of cadastral records, and by ceasing to overplay the security difficulties encountered by returnees.
Freedom of movement is also, rightly and understandably, a focus of frequent public statements on Kosovo. It is therefore not without some irony that we are seeing these very days what seems to be organised protests originating in the northern part of Mitrovica which actively oppose the full opening of the main bridge in the city to free movement in both directions.
Unfortunately events such as the organised protests in Mitrovica make it hard to discern whether political or humanitarian concerns are paramount in statements by some politicians in Belgrade on returns and freedom of movement.
I want to come back to the subject of the return of displaced persons and comment on it in the context of the future status issue. It is my impression that many displaced persons, though willing in theory to consider returning home, will not do so in practice until the status issue is resolved. The uncertainties they already feel about whether or not to return are accentuated by the more fundamental uncertainty of where, in legal and real terms, they will be returning to. Having coped with displacement for as long as they have, a wait-and-see policy seems preferable to a return which they fear (or are encouraged to fear) could be reversed at any moment either spontaneously, or as the result of a status agreement. Once that status agreement is out of the way, their decisions can and will be taken on the basis of available evidence, not hazy predictions of the future. Meanwhile, as the SRSG on Internally Displaced Persons, Walter Kaelin, has recently stated following a visit to the region, it is important that the authorities in Belgrade do continue working on creating local integration opportunities for IDPs, without precluding eventual return.
Decentralisation
Another area where further progress is necessary is in the field of decentralisation. In this connection, I would like to recognise the valuable support from the Geneva Centre. Decentralisation is a very complex matter anywhere, and it is important to have strong organisations, like the GCSP, to back up our work. Thank you.
Decentralisation is also a key area for Kosovo and is acknowledged as such by the entire international community, by the Kosovo Serbs, and, most importantly, by the PISG – though this acknowledgement has, frankly, yet to be matched by concrete progress on this issue. Belgrade has also taken an understandable interest in the issue of decentralisation, and Kosovo Serbs have, in a highly welcome move – although in the absence of encouragement from Belgrade – recently joined the decentralisation working groups at the technical level, and that is good news.
As said, decentralisation is a complex issue – as my recent experience as EU Special Representative in Skopje has taught me. The example of implementation of the Ohrid peace agreement is also instructive in demonstrating that balancing the real needs of municipalities, the opinions of interested parties, and the rights of minority groups will inevitably produce a final result that is, and can only be, a compromise. It is therefore essential that leaders at central and municipal level in Kosovo take the trouble to explain the requirements and intention of decentralisation before it begins. Only in this way, through an active debate led by the politicians, can public mistrust of the process be avoided.
But decentralisation being complex and “not easy” is not the same as saying it is “impossible”. We are now in July and the ‘pilot projects’, which have been discussed for months, must now get underway in Kosovo. They must be brought forward as quickly as possible. I have been assured as recently as yesterday by the Prime Minister of Kosovo that this will, indeed, happen within the coming days.
Peace-building - PISG and Standards
The areas of returns, freedom of movement and decentralisation represent only three of a huge number of complex and related issues which face us as challenges of peace-building in Kosovo.
Peace-building, as you all know, is a tough enough task anywhere. It is, as I have said already, particularly difficult in Kosovo where the political conflict, rather than being resolved by Resolution 1244, was simply frozen. It would be easy to be overwhelmed by these challenges if we didn’t have the correct tools with which to deal with them.
Fortunately, though, I have benefited from two far-sighted policy processes begun by my predecessors.
PISG
The first was the creation of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, including the Kosovo Assembly, and also the gradual transfer of competencies to the PISG – a transfer which I have accelerated and which I intend to pursue, and am pursuing, further.
It should go without saying that sustainable peace-building requires local ownership. The PISG provide exactly that. They would undoubtedly be even more effective in reflecting the view of all those who live in Kosovo if more Kosovo Serb politicians felt able to work within them. Joining the Assembly, where, despite a regrettable electoral boycott last October, the Serbs have ten reserved seats, would be a first step. It is therefore disappointing that despite several approaches and requests from senior Kosovo Serb politicians, the UN Security Council and many others, Belgrade has repeatedly failed to give its consent for the main Kosovo Serb political parties to join the legislative body that has the most impact in shaping their lives. We are in a process where we are trying to shape the future of the society in Kosovo. It is absolutely essential that those persons which have the most direct interest in shaping their own future, be given a chance to participate in the political process.
Standards
The second policy which has helped in our peace-building efforts in Kosovo is that of defining “Standards” for institutions and the larger society to achieve.
Standards is a framework and codification of the key elements needed for any society to function successfully – including protecting the rights and interests of all its communities – and for any government that aims to meet the needs of its people. The Standards framework for Kosovo is the first time that the international community has created such a specific template and required progress in its fulfilment. But the elements and concepts are not so very different from those embodied in the governance reform packages in many post-conflict and transition societies.
Prioritisation of Standards
Following my arrival in Pristina in August last year, and in the light of the deplorable violence which racked Kosovo in March of 2004, we took a fresh look at the Standards framework, setting out to pursue a more dynamic and a more priority-based approach to standards implementation. This was important for three reasons; first, to focus these activities precisely on the areas which had been reversed most dramatically by the violence in March 2004 – the protection of minorities and the promotion of their rights; second, to create a sense of forward momentum within the PISG and among the citizens of Kosovo, which could now work towards manageable goals with a recognisable end point; and third, to re-inject a sense of purpose into the international mission, which had frankly been demoralised by the rioting and the failure to respond.
The prioritisation process was necessary to create the right sense of purpose without in any way rewarding the violence which precipitated it. It was also necessary as a recognition that five years after the adoption of UNSCR 1244, the status quo was and is no longer sustainable. A new approach was clearly needed to rebuild belief and trust in the idea of peace, coexistence and a future for all communities in Kosovo.
Prioritisation - effects
And prioritisation has had some positively dramatic effects. First it has helped everyone to understand clearly what needs to be done to create and solidify in Kosovo a society where all citizens can thrive – in safety and dignity – and where the government works to meet the needs of the people. And it has focused efforts in these areas.
Second, by breaking down the standards into subsections and tasks and, wherever possible – that is, in the vast majority of cases – benchmarking these processes, UNMIK has helped define the governmental agenda both in terms of inputs and outputs. With each standard being given an indicator, UNMIK and the PISG can quickly become aware if progress in implementation in any given policy area is slipping. Standards implementation is therefore an objectively measurable process in a way that many reform processes are not.
Third, by measuring both the efforts made by the PISG, and the results achieved, it has been possible to identify real impediments to progress – some of which may not always lie in Kosovo – and take effective action to address the shortcomings.
Fourth, by showing success where it has occurred, and lack of progress where that is the case, we have been able on one hand to convince the PISG that they can implement standards – and thereby reform their governance and society – and not merely tell them that they should; and, on the other hand, we have been able to direct focus to shortcomings where harder work and stronger commitment are needed, for example on returns and freedom of movement.
Fifth, by using a traffic-light system to indicate forward-moving and sustained progress – and to flash warning lights in areas where progress is stalling or reversing – we have given the government a powerful tool for managing its own performance. One example demonstrates this. A month ago we turned 8 elements of one standard from green (progress) to red (lack of progress) as a result of actions (or rather inactions) by one Ministry. The issue was on the Government agenda within 24 hours.
Sixth, by creating and using objective, measurable indicators of progress we have been able to monitor and report to the international community a clear, unambiguous, and transparent picture of progress in government building and reform, and in the protection of the rights and interests of all the people of Kosovo.
So the Standards policy has proved beneficial to the PISG – but it has also been beneficial to UNMIK. By defining the parameters of work, the mission can now better plan its activity, and can better respond to the changes in Kosovo society as Standards implementation by the PISG proceeds. The challenges of peace-building are, by the standards process, channelled into a framework which allows for work in cross-cutting areas to be allocated sensibly, rather than on a responsive and ad hoc basis.
Standards – the review process
In accordance with the agenda and timetable for the way forward set last September by the UN Secretary-General, in consultation with the Contact Group, a comprehensive review of standards implementation is now underway and being led by the Norwegian Ambassador to NATO, Kai Eide. This review is designed to provide a larger political assessment focussing on the inevitable challenges in order to continue pushing the reform agenda forward, while at the same time recognising the important progress that has been made as genuine accomplishments and a pathway to the future. The comprehensive review, whose outcome is not a foregone conclusion, is a step on the way forward, as implementing and completing Standards implementation will remain a challenge for Kosovo in the long term.
Organised crime
But it is obvious that not all the challenges of peace-building can be captured within a single framework, no matter how comprehensive. For as some problems are solved, others emerge. Or perhaps I should say that as some problems are solved others become more apparent, since in fact they were always there.
One issue that is a good example of this phenomenon, and which is rapidly rising up the agenda, is that of organised crime.
That Kosovo should have a problem with organised crime should not come as a surprise to anybody – organised crime is a problem throughout the region and Kosovo is not immunised from that by the international presence. Instead Kosovo is in some respects more vulnerable to organised crime because of the limitations in, and on, its own institutions and the necessarily temporary nature of international institutions.
These limitations are particularly problematic in the field of the rule of law – where consistency and credibility are vital. In my view, only the settlement of Kosovo’s status can ultimately resolve this problem. But until then, it is incumbent upon us to do what we can by ensuring that the institutions which do exist are credible and that they are fitted to do the job in hand; and that those that do not exist are, where possible, brought into being.
If we fail to address organised crime, many people, being unsure of the permanent structures of the future, are likely to continue to depend instead on the temporary structures of the past, even if those structures stand outside the law.
Transfer of competences
At present the rule of law, at a central level, remains the responsibility of UNMIK. At a regional level the transfer of responsibility to local institutions has begun, with the Kosovo Police Service taking over command from international police in two regions so far. But since ownership is a precondition for the acceptance of institutions, and for their accountability, we now plan to move this process up to the central level, with the creation of full-fledged ministries of public order and justice by the end of the year.
The transfer we envisage in these crucial fields will be gradual and conditional. In the meantime UNMIK will use our accountability policy to monitor the performance of the new ministries and to hold ministers and civil servants to account for any misconduct.
Organised crime – whose responsibility?
It is a truism that organised crime is one of the best examples of successful regional and multi-ethnic co-operation in the Western Balkans. Therefore we must all make every effort to ensure that the policing and investigation of organised crime become an even better example of regional co-operation. I recognise that many countries within the region find co-operation on this matter difficult – and that these difficulties are magnified when the word “Kosovo” is entered into the equation. But addressing and tackling organised crime is too important a matter to let differences of politics stand in the way of regional police and judicial co-operation.
ISSR
The whole question of institutions in the field of security is of course linked to Kosovo’s status as well as its current situation. All the more reason, therefore, for security, in the broader sense of the word, to be tackled comprehensively and transparently. To this end I have instituted an Internal Security Sector Review. This review defines a process which should assist the PISG, in consultation with UNMIK and other partners in Kosovo and in the region, in identifying what Kosovo’s internal security sector requirements are and how to go about establishing them. The process should ensure that whatever the outcome of status negotiations, and whatever institutions are created, their formation will come as a result of a consensual process, and not through a solution imposed either by the international community, or by any particular interest group in Kosovo. On this initiative, and on security initiatives in general, affordability and the need for international financial and other support is essential.
Status- the need for clarity
I have, in the course of this speech, made several references to the need for ‘clarity’ at the most fundamental level – that is, in terms of status. To say that is not to make any judgement on what that status should be – that is not for me to do – except to state the well-known, and very welcome, principles enunciated by the EU, the US, and indeed the Contact Group as a whole: these principles, to guide the talks on status, are that there be no partition of Kosovo; that there be no new union with any neighbouring country; and that there be no return to the situation prevailing before March 1999. And, clearly, in any resolution of status the full protection of minority rights, the resolution of property issues, the clear right of return, and the protection of cultural and religious heritage must be addressed as a base-line among many other important issues.
Today I have mentioned a couple of the areas where clarity on status would in my view bring immediate benefit to Kosovo and to the region – that is, in the permanence of institutions and therefore in the rule of law; and in the field of economics. But in truth clarity on status would be beneficial in all fields – providing transparency for all, from large investors to individual returnees alike. And the benefits would not, and cannot, accrue to Kosovo alone. This fact is, I believe, increasingly recognised in the region and in the wider world. Settling Kosovo must aim at normalising and stabilising Kosovo, but it must equally aim at normalising and stabilising the entire Western Balkan region, so that all countries of the region can proceed on their Euro-Atlantic agenda.
So, as I stated at the beginning, status is not only a peace-building problem in Kosovo, it is the peace-building problem in Kosovo. So far the work of the international community in Kosovo has been somewhat akin to building a house from the roof downwards. We now have a fine roof and good walls in place – democratic institutions, multi-ethnic policing, legal protection of minority rights, etc. But in the absence of foundations – a fundamental legal basis for the continuation of these laws and institutions into the future – the work is, and will remain, incomplete.
With the beginning of status talks, most likely later this year, we will have reached those foundations. This must be regarded as the true beginning of the end of the peace-building process in Kosovo and in the region. After the talks on status, a new phase will begin – but since we don’t know what the outcome will be, we cannot know yet what we will be calling this new phase.
Thank you, Ladies and Gentlemen, for listening. I think now we have a question and answer session, for which I hope I have left enough time.”